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ABSTRACT 
 
Two-sided markets (or platforms) are defined as the platforms that provide goods or services to two distinct groups of 
customers, and that intermediate the transactions between these groups. Such platforms are of great importance in 
today’s global business world and considerable amount of value is created by these platforms. The success of numerous 
firms in the business world, including but are not limited to Google, eBay, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Sony PlayStation, 
Visa, is mainly due to the advantages provided by the two-sided platforms. This paper is devoted to the two-sided markets 
phenomenon, its basic characteristics, architecture as well as mechanism. The paper explains the aforementioned 
information regarding two-sided markets by providing the case from Apple’s digital application platform. Furthermore, 
Apple’s competitive advantage stemming from this platform has been articulated by the theoretical perspective provided 
by the Resource Based View (RBV).  
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1. Introduction 
Two-sided markets, also known as two-sided platforms (or multi-sided platforms), are one of the emerging business 
models. In today’s economy, a considerable proportion of the value is created by two-sided platform businesses and the 
community built by them (Evans and Schmalensee, 2007). Examples of such platforms include but are not limited to 
Google, eBay, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Sony PlayStation, Visa, etc. The reason why these companies become so 
successful and attract millions of people is the ability to bring together distinct groups of customers. 
The term is first coined by Rochet and Tirole (2003) and well defined by Evans (2003a, 2003b) as the platforms that 
“provide goods or services to several distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way and who rely on the 
platform to intermediate transactions between them” (Evans, 2003a; Evans, 2003b; Rochet and Tirolei, 2003). Two-sided 
platforms are like catalysts in nature. Catalyst, in chemistry terms, is a substance that causes or accelerates a chemical 
reaction between two or more other agents. The resulting substance has a greater value than the components created it. 
In addition, the catalyst is not affected by the reaction and does not disappear. Identical to chemical catalysts, two-sided 
markets bring two groups of agents together to create a value-added platform (Evans and Schmalensee, 2007).  
Apple, with its digital application market, has built one of the most appealing platforms in mobile device market. This 
platform deserves to be named as a two-sided market because of the necessary components that it possesses. This 
essay is devoted to discuss Apple’s digital application platform and will detail the basic characteristics of two-sided 
markets in this context. The essay will also explicate the architecture of the platform under discussion. Finally, competitive 
advantage created by Apple’s two-sided market will be detailed from the perspective of resource-based view. 
2. Two-Sided Market Characteristics 
In order for a business to be called two-sided, it should possess several basic characteristics. First and foremost, there 
should be two different groups of customers that have different objectives and demand patterns. Second, these groups 
have to need each other in some way and are not able to capture the value by their mutual interaction. Third, an 
intermediary is needed to facilitate the interactions between these groups in order to create value (Evans, 2003a; Evans, 
2003b).  
Apple’s digital application platform possesses basic characteristics that two-sided businesses should have. Application 
developers and users constitute the distinct groups of customers (or sides) that Apple has in its two-sided business, or 
more specifically two-sided business. The objective of application developers is to develop and sell their applications to 
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mobile phone users. Mobile device users, on the other hand, like to purchase and install applications to their phones. 
Apple, as the owner of the platform, designs and manufactures mobile devices (i.e., iPhone, iPod, and iPad) and creates 
online systems (i.e., iTunes and App Store) to bring these two distinct groups together. Without Apple’s digital application 
platform, application developers couldn’t have distributed their applications in such an efficient fashion and reached such a 
big customer base. Mobile device users, on the other hand, couldn’t have easily found the applications and/or games that 
they demand.   
However, these basic characteristics are not alone adequate to make a two-sided business successful. Another important 
aspect of the two-sided businesses is that they must solve the chicken-egg problem (Evans, 2003b; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002). That is, one group of customers can only benefit from the platform if there is satisfactory number of 
customers in the other group, and vice versa. This is called indirect network externality which is very well accomplished by 
Apple (Evans, 2003b; Hagiu, 2007; Rochet and Tirole, 2004). Application developers are willing to develop and contribute 
to the platform because there are millions of mobile device users in the market created by Apple. Mobile device users 
participate in the platform because they know that there are capacious amount of applications that can operate on their 
mobile device. However, this has to be coordinated and balanced in some way by the platform owner to create demand 
from the both sides.  
There are three ways or strategies (or three types of two-sided platforms) to coordinate and balance these interactions 
and to increase and capture indirect network externalities: match-making, audience-building, and cost-minimizing (Evans 
and Schmalensee, 2007). Match-maker platforms facilitate the mutual transactions. Apple platform enables two groups of 
customers to find each other, which is an indication of its match-making capability. Audience-builder platforms assemble 
an audience in order to attract another group of customers to participate in the platform. Apple achieves this by providing 
mobile devices to consumers. By owning an Apple device, users get access to free functionalities (such as phone, music 
player, social networking, calendar, online maps, etc.) as well as the capability of downloading the applications of their 
interest. By accumulating millions of users into its platform, Apple attracts application developers to sell their applications 
through the iTunes and App Store. Platforms that have cost-minimizing strategy increase efficiency and reduce the 
transaction and search costs for both sides. Apple’s cost-minimizing strategy in its platform is that (1) mobile device users 
can easily and quickly search and download the applications that they demand, (2) application developers can easily find 
a customer base to sell their applications by paying no credit card, hosting, and marketing fees.    
While creating strategies to attract different customer groups, platform owners should also be cognizant in their pricing 
strategies. Two-sided businesses cannot implement pricing strategies as a one-sided business, which realizes revenues 
from only one side. Pricing is a bit more complicated in platform businesses, because two-sided platform owners should 
determine price for each type of customers. The price should be optimally set, so that each type of customers will be 
willing to pay that amount and participate in the platform activity. A typical platform owner usually chooses one side as the 
“subsidy” and charge less or none (Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
3. Architecture and Mechanism 
 
3.1. Platform Architecture 
Baldwin and Woodard (2008) argue that there are three components of any platform architecture: core components, 
peripheral components, and interfaces. Core components are the ones with low variety that are fixed and stay stable over 
time, whereas peripheral components (or complements) have high variety and high rates of change over time. Interfaces 
are the design rules which enable the core and the complements to work together as a system. Like core components, 
interfaces are also long-lived and constitute the platform with the core (Baldwin and Woodard, 2008).  
Apple’s digital application platform in mobile device market has the same set of components in its architecture. At the core 
of the architecture is the hardware which includes Apple’s mobile devices, such as iPod, iPhone, and iPad and operating 
system (iPhone OS) which includes core services and media layer as well as key frameworks for application development. 
Soft component of the architecture also includes the user interface, phone application, multimedia applications, internet 
connectivity and email applications, etc. Frameworks are bundles that contain a dynamic shared library and associated 
resources, and constitute the interface of the Apple’s platform architecture (Apple Inc., iPhone Dev Center). These key 
frameworks constitute the platform itself and they have high levels of reusability which reduce the need to reinventing the 
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wheel. Therefore, application developers are able to access these resources with the support provided by Apple. 
Peripheral components of Apple are the applications created by the application developers. These are highly changeable 
over time as the demand patterns evolve.  
It is of great importance to articulate the standards of the platform architecture. According to the classification of 
Henderson (2005), there are two sets of standards in platforms: degree of access to component designers (i.e., open and 
closed) and the mode of control over the use and evolution of the standards (i.e., public and proprietary) (Henderson, 
2005). Closed- proprietary standards are only accessible through contracts and agreements with the proprietor. Under the 
use of such standards, hard or soft components of another system will not work on the proprietary system (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2007). Apple’s digital application platform is an example of the employment of such standards. Apple is the 
sole proprietor of its mobile devices as the manufacturer of all of the core components of the platform including the 
hardware as well as operating system (i.e., iPhone OS) and key application development frameworks. Apple makes 
contracts with its suppliers (mostly Taiwan based) in order to supply the key hard components of the platform (Chen, 
2009). In order to produce the peripheral components of the platform (i.e., applications and accessories), it is mandatory to 
make agreements and contracts with Apple. Otherwise, Apple does not allow other parties to produce components of its 
platform. It is not because mobile devices, components and complements are not imitable, but because Apple only allows 
those producers that agree with the terms and conditions under the contract. For instance, third party applications can be 
developed through “jailbraking” which will work on iPhone system (Krazit, 2007). However, this can’t be commercialized 
without enrolling Apple’s iPhone application development program. 
Closed-proprietary nature of the platform under discussion is also parallel with the issue of design dependencies, which is 
known as the information needed to produce a new product which works seamless with the existing ones (Woodward, 
2008). Teece (1986) identifies two types of dependencies: generic and specialized (Teece, 1986). Unlike the generic case 
which requires common information to a product category in its design, specialized case requires the information which is 
closely related to a specific product platform. Apple’s digital application platform constitutes a specialized design 
dependency, in which application developers must have the necessary product specific information in the development of 
the applications. Application developers can only have this information through contracting with Apple (i.e. subscription as 
an iPhone application developer) (Apple, iPhone Developer Program). Therefore, application developers who are willing to 
accept such dependency develop applications for iPhone. Apple is still in advantageous position, because the platform 
itself has some level of value for the users without the development of the applications (Chen and Nalebuff, 2007).      
3.2. Platform Mechanism 
As for the mechanism of Apple’s platform as a two-sided business, there are two sets of customers that are in need of 
each other for the creation of value. These two sides are connected to the platform through interfaces, which is only 
possible by accepting the contractual conditions. If both sides accept the conditions, they can be a part of the platform and 
benefit from the opportunities and functionalities provided by the platform.   
One side is composed of application developers. Application developers, through subscribing as an iPhone application 
developer, get access to the proprietary information provided by Apple. The tools provided by Apple include Xcode (a 
development environment providing project management, source editor, and graphical debugger), iPhone simulator 
(provides a simulated iPhone environment to test the applications), interface builder, and other developer instruments. 
Apple also provides several resources to its iPhone application developers including forums, getting started videos and 
documents, iPhone reference library, and coding resources (Apple, iPhone Developer Program). After the development of 
the application, application developers have several benefits when they are distributing their application through Apple’s 
iTunes Connect, which is a suite for submitting and managing the developed applications (Apple, Developer Support 
Center). Application developers can (1) determine the price level for each application sold, (2) get 70% of the sales 
revenue out of their applications, and (3) waive credit card, hosting, as well as marketing fees (developer.apple.com) 
(Apple, iPhone Developer Program). On the other hand, application developers should agree several terms and 
conditions, such as restrictions on sharing Apple’s confidential information, services, and content (Apple, Developer 
Support Center). 
Mobile device users constitute the other side of the two-sided platform. Users can buy a mobile device (e.g., iPhone) from 
only the Apple retail and online stores as well as the wireless carriers. The users who own Apple’s mobile devices are able 
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to use the already-installed features as well as the applications that they will download from the iTunes system or App 
Store.      
As the owner of this two-sided platform, Apple coordinates and balances the demand from these two sides with the design 
and development strategy of its platform architecture as well as its pricing and governing strategy. As articulated by Evans 
and Schmalensee (2007), Apple executes three types of activities which are more or less implemented by the two-sided 
businesses: build, stimulate, and govern (Evans and Schmalensee, 2007). First, Apple creates a value proposition for both 
application developers (an efficient application development opportunity and distribution channel with a large customer 
base) and mobile device users (a useful mobile device having many functionalities and application choices with easy 
search). Then, Apple facilitates search and provides information for both sides through interfaces. Finally, Apple sets the 
rules for the platform and standards for the engagement through contracts and agreements which is mentioned above.     
Next section details the discussion of two relevant theories: (1) Apple’s competitive advantage from a resource-based 
view, and (2) Evolution of iPhone platform from the perspective of punctuated equilibrium theory. 
4. Theoretical Perspective 
 
4.1. Resource-based View and Apple’s Competitive Advantage 
Resource-based view (RBV) is one of the most widely used theory in strategic management. Firm resources are “all 
assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable 
the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991; Daft, 1983). 
The basic premise in RBV is that resources that firms possess determine the organizational performance (Barney, 1991). 
However, only possessing resources is not enough to create competitive advantage in the marketplace and sustain it. 
Sustainable competitive advantage can only be achieved, if a firm creates valuable and rare resources which are not 
imitable and substitutable. It is the resource heterogeneity what makes firms different from others and create competitive 
advantages over competitors (Barney, 1991). 
RBV as a theoretical lens has been recently articulated and implemented in the context of two-sided markets. Eisenmann 
et al. (2007) examined RBV in the context of platform envelopment, which is defined as “entry by one platform provider 
into another’s market” (Eisenmann et al., 2007). It is argued that it is very difficult to enter into an already established 
market which has the network effect and switching cost advantage. Another way to enter into the market is through 
leveraging the shared user relationships and common components. From an RBV perspective, the paper discusses that a 
company’s customer base is one of its resources which create competitive advantage. In particular, two-sided markets, 
where network effects are of great importance, should have a greater user base to achieve advantages. Eisenmann et al. 
(2007) proposes the platform envelopment approach for a firm to enter into a market which is achieved by using the 
competitor’s customer base overlapping with its user base. By employing this approach, firms do not need to rely on 
fundamental innovations (Eisenmann et al., 2007). 
There is another research study which uses RBV as the theory base and which treats customers as the fundamental 
resource of the two-sided firms. In this research, research heterogeneity and isolating mechanism are discussed in RBV 
context and network effect is introduced as the basis for these mechanisms in the two-sided platforms. They argued that 
customer relationships are one of the critical firm resources which create network effects and which creates competitive 
advantage for such businesses (Sun and Tse, 2009).   
The problem with these two research studies is that they propose customer base of firms as competitive advantage 
creating critical resource. According to resource-based view, it is the firms’ internal resources and capabilities which create 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Customers are usually viewed as the external resources of firms which may not be 
controlled like internal resources. That is why, it is of great importance to examine RBV in the context two-sided markets 
by considering platform owner’s internal resources and capabilities as resources creating competitive advantage. 
Apple, as the owner of a two-sided platform, is a very successful firm in the mobile devices market with millions of devices 
and billions of applications since its launch. Apple’s success in this market is basically coming from its two-sided business 
strategy based on its digital application platform. Because of the reasons enunciated below, this platform possesses four 
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conditions (i.e., value, rarity, inimitability, non-substitutability) of RBV that are required to create competitive advantage 
over competitors. 
The first condition of RBV is the value of the resources (Barney, 1991). Apple’s platform has a great value which is created 
with a two-sided philosophy. The value proposition to both sides of the market enables Apple to attract these two distinct 
groups of customers into the platform. This indirect network externality enables Apple to accumulate millions of users as 
well as application developers in creating an enormous ecosystem of dependencies (Evans, 2003b; Hagiu, 2007; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2004). The value of the platform is also created by setting the standards to make the platform closed and 
proprietary, which differentiates from the other platforms. 
The second condition in RBV is that the resources should be rare, so that competitors cannot own a similar resource 
(Barney, 1991). As mentioned above, Apple sets a closed-proprietary standard for its platform and makes contractual 
agreements with its suppliers as well as two sides of the platform. Such being the case, nobody can do business with 
Apple without making contractual agreements which creates rareness. Another factor creating rareness is the mobile 
device itself. The mobile devices having various functionalities attracts millions of users into the platform which enable 
Apple to operate and promote its application development side of the platform, which in turn help balancing the two-sides 
of the platform. 
The third characteristic of RBV returns is that resources should be inimitable (Barney, 1991). As mentioned, even if there 
are some ways to imitate mobile devices, such as iPhone, or their various components, it is difficult to commercialize it. In 
addition, it is not enough to imitate Apple’s architecture because managing the two-sided platform is also an inimitable 
advantage because of the fact that the relationship between the form resources and competitive advantage may not be 
understood by the competitors (i.e., causal ambiguity) (Barney, 1991). Other inimitable resources of Apple are its 
innovativeness and marketing strategy. Through innovativeness, Apple always designs cutting-edge technology which 
always attracts large customer base (Nussbaum, 2008). Through innovativeness, Apple designed iPhone and competitors 
could only start to imitate and design similar phones after two years of iPhone launch. While competitors try to imitate 
iPhone and try to identify the weaknesses of the device, Apple use this time to innovate more and continuously improve 
the device (Malone, 2010). Effective brand management and market positioning enable Apple to have a valuable brand 
which is the most important resource to imitate.          
Finally, firm resources should be non-substitutable to create competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). In this context, 
Apple’s mobile device platform is not substitutable because there is no any strategic equivalent platform having similar or 
same characteristics and functionalities. Although similar mobile devices have been designed and launched in the market 
recently, they could not reach the success that Apple achieved because of the fact that they could not follow a two-sided 
platform strategy as Apple did.   
4.2. Dynamic Perspective 
Baldwin and Woodard (2008) argue that, like biological systems, platform systems also evolve over time (Baldwin and 
Woodard, 2008). Apple’s capability to leverage its two-sided platform towards advantage over its competitors did not 
happen instantly. Apple’s mobile device platform, with its architecture as well as mechanism, followed an evolutionary 
path, which can be explained by a dynamic resource-based perspective (D-RBV) (Helfat and Petaraf, 2003). 
D-RBV perspective suggests that firm capabilities follow the path very similar to the product life cycle (founding, 
development, maturity, and branching) (Helfat and Petaraf, 2003). When iPod is introduced in 2001, Apple’s capability was 
in a founding stage. iPod was designed as a portable music player in which users can install the music that they want and 
download from the Internet onto it. As years progress, more users purchased iPods as Apple designed and marketed new 
versions of it, which is an indication of development of the capability. In 2003, Apple introduced its iTunes Store, in which 
users can directly download music into their iPods. Apple experienced a maturity with this store, which was first attempt to 
its two-sided business strategy, albeit the business was one-sided (Apple as the direct seller of music files to consumers).  
D-RBV suggests that after a capability reaches to maturation, a firm has several branching strategies (retirement, 
retrenchment, replication, renewal, redeployment, recombination), which can lead to a diminishing or increasing levels of 
its capability and competitive advantage (Helfat and Petaraf, 2003). Apple chose a renewal strategy. In 2007, Apple 
launched its iPhone and App Store for users to download music, applications, games, and other digital content. Until 2008, 
this was still a one-sided business since third party applications were not allowed on iPhones. In 2008, Apple launched its 
Application Developer Program and provided developers with a set of tools and frameworks to encourage application 
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development. Since then, Apple’s iPhone platform has two sides and follows a two-sided business strategy. With its 
growing and evolving capability on two-sided strategy, Apple’s competitive advantage seems to be sustainable. 
5. Conclusion 
Two-sided markets have recently become important aspects of the economies throughout the world create substantial 
amount of value to its customers as well as the platform itself. The characteristics and mechanism possessed by these 
platforms allow firms to have a competitive advantage in the market.  
This paper is devoted to the two-sided markets phenomenon, its basic characteristics, architecture as well as mechanism. 
The paper explains the aforementioned information regarding two-sided markets by providing the case from Apple’s digital 
application platform. Furthermore, Apple’s competitive advantage stemming from this platform has been articulated by the 
theoretical perspective provided by the Resource Based View (RBV).   
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